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Abstract
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) is the most widely used measure of general
belief in conspiracy theories. The scale comprises five related but distinct factors (Govern-
ment Malfeasance, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Personal
Wellbeing, and Control of Information). Despite this, investigators have typically treated the
GCBS as unidimensional by referencing only overall total. Although, the GCBS possesses
established psychometric properties, critics question its factorial structure, suggest alterna-
tive models, and recommend routine examination of GCBS dimensions as part of analysis.
Through two studies, the present paper assessed GCBS factorial structure, internal reliabil-
ity, convergent validity, and invariance. This involved comparing the original five-factor solu-
tion with alternative one, two, and three-factor models. To ensure that the best fitting model
was robust, the authors conducted analysis in two independent samples (Study one, N =
794, UK university-based sample; and Study two, N = 418, UK respondents collected via a
market research company). Results in both studies indicated superior fit for the correlated
five-factor solution. This solution demonstrated invariance across gender, and samples
(Study one and two). Furthermore, the total scale and five subfactors evinced good alpha
and omega total reliability. Convergent validity testing exhibited associations of an expected
strength between conspiracist beliefs, reality testing, and cognitive insight. Large intercorre-
lations existed among GCBS subfactors, suggesting that the measure reflects a narrow set
of interrelated conspiracist assumptions. These findings support the use of overall scale
scores as an index of belief in conspiracy theories.
Introduction
Although the term ‘conspiracy theory’ has no single, agreed definition, conceptual delimita-
tions share core characteristics [1]. Thematically, these centre on the belief that powerful, mul-
tiple actors manipulate events/actions in order to achieve malevolent goals [2]. A further key
feature of conspiracy theories is that their narratives, despite lacking a robust evidential basis,
usually cite supporting scientific evidence [3]. Accordingly, conspiracy theories can provide
apparently, credible (reasoned) alternatives to mainstream, official explanations [4–6].
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Conspiracy theories become particularly compelling when either an authorised account
appears inadequate, or an event has no definitive explanation [7–8].
In this context, individuals engage with conspiracies because they facilitate comprehension
of the origins and consequences of significant novel, or threatening events [9].
Thus, despite being dismissed by critics as fallacies [10], fringe notions (lay beliefs), and
simplified views of the social and political world [11], conspiracy theories are regularly vali-
dated by members of the general population. Illustratively, in a nationally representative sur-
vey of U.S. adults, 55% of respondents endorsed at least one of several presented conspiracy
theories (e.g., “The U.S. invasion of Iraq was not part of a campaign to fight terrorism, but was
driven by oil companies and Jews in the U.S. and Israel”) [12]. Likewise, significant numbers
of U.S. and U.K. citizens believe that their respective governments assisted or distorted infor-
mation about terrorist attacks (i.e., 9/11 and 7/7 respectively) [13].
Conspiracy theories endure largely because they are resistant to falsification. Explicitly, it is
difficult for detractors to establish that alleged covert activities/actions did not occur [14–15].
Furthermore, in response to disconfirming evidence conspiracy believers characteristically
add layers of intrigue to legitimise theories [16]. A related issue that hinders dismissal of con-
spiracies is that theories are not always false (e.g., the Watergate scandal, which involved a
series of intertwining illegal political actions overseen by the administration of U.S. President
Richard Nixon). For believers, such exceptional instances provide justification for the authen-
ticity of conspiratorial accounts, regardless of their inherent veracity and the implausibility of
conspiracy theories generally.
Noting the societal and political importance of conspiracy theories within modern-day cul-
ture, academic interest in the topic has flourished over the past decade. Researchers contend
that psychological understanding is essential because conspiratorial narratives can influence/
bias individual and collective perceptions of important current (e.g., vaccinations) and histori-
cal events (e.g., moon landings). Notable negative consequences of belief in conspiracy theories
are reduced involvement with and faith in social institutions (e.g., democratic, governmental
and security systems) [17].
Conceptualising conspiracy
Conspiratorial ideation refers to the proclivity to believe that clandestine groups and organisa-
tions secretly manipulate events and power relations [18]. These key refrains are central to the-
oretical delineations of conspiracy theories. For instance, Sunstein and Vermeule [1] define
conspiracy theories as attempts to attribute outcomes to the scheming of powerful individuals,
who attempt to conceal their involvement and activities. From these conceptualisations, it is
clear that conspiratorial ideation embodies the canonical themes of secrecy, subterfuge and
manipulation.
Congruent with the negative connotations of these features, academic theorists frequently
regard conspiratorial ideation deleteriously. Concomitantly, much research explores relation-
ships between conspiracism, the tendency to engage in conspiratorial ideation and endorse
related theories, and maladaptive outcomes (e.g., cognitive-perceptual distortions, ill-rational
thought processes and inaccurate world-view) [19–22].
The distinction between broad conspiratorial thinking and belief in specific conspiracy the-
ories is important to note. Primarily, because the interchangeable use of the term obscures the
important theoretical nuance that conspiratorial ideation (generic) is likely to result in endorse-
ment of a range of theories, whereas belief in specific theories may be restricted to particular
accounts. The former denotes an overarching worldview, whilst the latter is selective and
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focuses on particular instances. This distinction influences not only perceptions of conspirato-
rial theory, but also informs development of measurement tools (discussed later).
Drawing on the ideational perspective, scholars assume that conspiratorial thinking results
in extreme reactions arising from an over-reliance on subjective-emotional factors and/or
truncated or illogical reasoning [19, 23–24]. This perception, although principally valid, masks
adaptive aspects of conspiratorial ideation. Particularly, the desire to seek truth and strive for
social advancement and equity [20]. Measures of conspiracy tend to overlook potentially posi-
tive aspects of conspiratorial thinking and prefer to focus on adverse consequences.
The maladaptive viewpoint of conspiratorial ideation assumes that endorsement of theories
characterises a self-protecting defence mechanism that reconciles discord between internal
representations (beliefs) and conflicting external, real-world evidence (facts). This explicates
why much research reports associations between conspiratorial ideation and ill-rational,
unsystematic thought processes and an over-reliance on anecdotal data.
Commensurate with this view, literature examining conspiracy endorsers portrays them as
suspicious, worried about personal danger, ideologically eccentric, inclined to perceiving
agency in actions, and likely to treat nonsense as meaningful [25]. Hart and Graether [25]
testing the validity of this generalised profile, found that bullshit receptivity (the readiness to
ascribe meaning to material that implies but actually contains no sense), dangerous-world
beliefs, and schizotypy both independently and additively predicted belief in conspiracies.
Analysis suggested also that political orientation and hyperactive agency detection (readiness
to ascribe events in the environment to the behaviour of agents) were potentially important
factors.
Measurement of conspiracy theories
It is important to acknowledge these prevailing perceptions of conspiratorial belief because
they have directly informed the development of self-report instruments (i.e., content and
emphasis) and the direction of research. In the case of belief in conspiracies theories, this has
resulted in the production of a number of self-report scales. Swami, Barron, Weis, Voracek,
Stieger, and Furnham [26] place these into two broad categories, comprising endorsement of
specific conspiracy theories and validation of generic conspiracy-related beliefs. The former
approach requires participants to indicate the degree to which they endorse subsets of real-
world conspiracy theories (e.g., the US government orchestrated 9/11). Hence, conspiracy
selection is arbitrary and bounded by investigator preference. The notion underlying this
method is that substantiation of explicit theories reflects conspiratorial belief generally [8].
This perspective assumes that overall scores provide an accurate estimation of belief in con-
spiracy theories.
Examples include the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI; [22]), the Belief in
Specific Conspiracies Scale (BSCS; [27]), and the Composite Conspiracy Beliefs Scales (CCBS;
[28]) (see [26] for a detailed list of measures). These scales index a broad range of prominent
theories (assassination of John F. Kennedy, government cover-up of alien landings, oil compa-
nies influencing the political decision to go to war in Iraq, etc.). Despite common application,
this approach possesses limitations. Particularly, it compromises validity by sampling limited
construct breadth, and overlooks factors (such as historical context, geographical location and
familiarity) that influence awareness and validation of particular conspiracy theories.
Observing these issues, Brotherton, French, and Pickering [29] developed the Generic
Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), which focuses on abstract, overarching thematic concepts
without reference to particular theories. For example, the notion that government agencies
routinely conceal information in order to deceive the public. This idea is applicable to myriad
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assassination-based conspiracies (i.e., President John F. Kennedy, Princess Diana, and Osama
Bin Laden), and political cover-ups (e.g., providing false details about alien visitation). This
method derives from the assumption that generic belief in conspiracy theories predicts ratifica-
tion of particular theories. Drawing on this idea, researchers have concomitantly developed
similar measures (e.g., Conspiracy Theory Questionnaire, CTQ, [30]; the Conspiracy Mental-
ity Questionnaire, CMB, [31]).
The present paper focused on the GCBS because it has become a recognised, widely used
measure of conspiratorial belief (e.g., [32]). Indeed, researchers have translated the GCBS into
several languages (i.e., French, [33]; Macedonian, [34]; Persian, [35]; Japanese [36]). Consider-
ing the effectiveness of the GCBS as an overall index of conspiratorial belief, the scale correlates
highly with other widely used measures (e.g., Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory, BCTI,
[22]; and Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, CMQ, [31]) [26]. Moreover, the GCBS demon-
strates similar associations with criterion variables to those observed by other frequently used
measures of belief in conspiracy theories. For instance, studies typically report a moderate rela-
tionship with schizotypy (see [37], GCBS; [2], BCTI; and [31], CMQ). Similarly, belief in con-
spiracy theories correlates moderately with belief in the paranormal. These associations are
stable across a range of schizotypy and paranormal belief measures [38]. Findings indicate that
the GCBS produces outcomes similar to those observed with other measures of conspiratorial
belief. Overall, evidence suggests the GCBS is a conceptually sound index of belief in conspir-
acy theories. However, recent concerns have arisen regarding the scales factorial structure.
Brotherton et al. [29] developed the GCBS via a series of studies. Initially, participants com-
pleted 75-items reflecting broad conspiratorial notions (e.g., “Small groups of people are in
possession of secret knowledge which would change our understanding of the world, and are
deliberately keeping it hidden”). Exploratory factor analysis of participant responses identified
five facets: Government Malfeasance (GM), Extraterrestrial Cover-up (ET), Malevolent Global
Conspiracies (MG), Personal Wellbeing (PW), and Control of Information (CI). These factors
subsequently informed the development of the 15-item GCBS. Ensuing studies established the
reliability (internal and re-test) and validity (content, criterion-related, convergent and dis-
criminant) of the GCBS. Relevant to the current paper confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
demonstrated that the emergent five-factor solution possessed adequate fit, and was superior
to a one-factor (unidimensional) solution. Despite this, subsequent research has generally used
GCBS total scores as an overall measure of belief in conspiracy theories (e.g., [30, 37]).
Notwithstanding general academic acceptance and regular use in research [38], subsequent
evaluation has raised concerns about the psychometric structure of the GCBS. Explicitly, stud-
ies have failed to reproduce the five-factor model, and observed poor fit for the single factor
solution (i.e., [26,35]). This suggests that the Brotherton et al. [29] model may vary as a func-
tion of sample and therefore lack measurement invariance. This is difficult to determine
because studies testing factor structure are limited. However, consideration of sampling tech-
niques across pertinent studies reveals potentially important differences.
For instance, the Brotherton et al. [29] studies recruited participants via blog, email and
web, their samples were predominately British and composed of a high proportion of under-
graduate students. Whereas, Swami et al. [26] used a sample of U.S. participants recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Utilising these data, via principal axis factor
analysis (PAFA), Swami et al. [26] proposed an alternative two-factor model comprising Gen-
eral Conspiracist Beliefs (6-items) and Extraterrestrial Conspiracist Beliefs (4-item). Further
CFA indicated poor fit for one-factor, two-factor and five-factor models.
Based on these findings, Swami et al. [26] determined that the failure to find adequate
model fit was indicative of inherent problems with GCBS dimensionality. Explicitly, it was
unclear whether scale latent structure indexed single or multiple dimensions of conspiratorial
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thinking. Consequently, Swami et al. [26] concluded that at best the scale taps into two factors,
or at worst indexes multiple poorly converging dimensions. Consequently, Swami et al. [26]
supported routine examination of GCBS structure as part of analysis.
Moreover, a recent Persian translation of the GCBS [35], using members from the general
population from public places in Tehran, failed also to replicate the original five-factor struc-
ture. This paper was important because it drew extensively on the approach of Swami et al.
[26]. Atari et al. [35], using principal-axis factor analysis, produced a novel three-factor latent
structure comprising Political Conspiracies (including GM and MG), Scientific Conspiracies
(combining PW and CI), and Extraterrestrial Cover-up (consistent with EC). Despite differ-
ences, this model was interpretable in the context of the Brotherton et al. [29] five-factor solu-
tion, and loaded on to a higher-order general conspiracy dimension.
Consistent with Swami et al. [26] and Atari et al. [35], Swami, Barron, Weis, and Furnham
[39] reported issues with the GCBS factorial structure. Using data from UK respondents, who
intended to vote in the EU membership referendum, the five- and one-factor models demon-
strated poor fit. Furthermore, the Swami et al. [26] two-factor model, consisting of General
Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) and Extraterrestrial Conspiracist Beliefs, also demonstrated poor
fit. Only permitting item co-variation produced acceptable fit. Based on this analysis Swami
et al. [39] used only scores from the GCB factor.
The present research
Notwithstanding criticisms, evaluation of the GCBS is limited. Hence, assessment across dif-
ferent samples is necessary to establish measure reliability, appropriateness and constraints
[35]. This is particularly true of scale dimensionality. Noting variations in sample composition
across studies assessing GCBS factorial structure, the present paper tested the applicability of
the original five-factor solution within two samples often used by researchers (i.e., university-
based and market research company; participation panel) [38]. The fact that it was similar in
breadth and reach to that used in the validation phase of GCBS development informed inclu-
sion of the university-based sample [see 29]. Additionally, it was representative of sampling
employed by a significant proportion of studies examining belief in conspiracy theories (e.g.,
[8,19–20]). This assertion is based on a recent meta-analysis by Goreis and Voracek [38] of
studies from the beginning of database-records until March of 2018, who found that 36.8%
(N = 61) employed student samples.
The fact that recent work into conspiracy theories has utilised online participation pools
such as MTurk (e.g., [40–41]) indicates that internet crowdsourcing is an important emerging
method of data collection. Goreis and Voracek [38] reported that 15.7% (N = 26) of conspiracy
studies used MTurk. Future numbers are likely to increase significantly because internet
crowdsourcing provides samples that contain greater variation and have greater demographic
diversity than traditional internet samples. Furthermore, at a practical level, online participa-
tion pools provide an accepted, expedient source of high-quality data (see [42]). Noting the
trend towards using internet crowdsourcing within social science research generally, and con-
spiracy work specifically, the present paper assessed the fit of proposed GCBS models within a
sample collected by a market research company.
Testing the factorial structure in this manner assessed the robustness of the five-factor
model in a sample often used by scholars. This approach helps to identify the remit and
boundaries of the GCBS. Secondly, analysis indicated whether the GCBS was an appropriate
measure of general belief in conspiracy theories. This was an important question to address
because the majority of psychological research has used the GCBS as an overall measure (see
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[38]). Accordingly, it was important to assess the fit of previously proposed factorial solutions
(i.e., one, two, three and five).
The second study also tested the convergent validity of the GCBS using the known corre-
lates proneness to reality testing deficits [8] and self-certainty [43]. Previous academic work
has established that these variables positively correlate to a moderate extent with belief in con-
spiracy theories [8,44]. High proneness to reality testing deficits references the tendency to
focus on internally generated, intra-psychic data. Accordingly, the construct is associated with
a subjective-intuitive style of thinking. When this mode of thinking predominates, individuals
base their perceptions of the world on personal views and feelings, inclining them to endorse
conspiratorial notions [8]. Moreover, belief in conspiracies is also associated with greater self-
certainty. This manifests as overconfidence in the validity of personal beliefs [43]. Hence,
believers in conspiracy theories typically require less evidence before arriving at a decision
and tend to demonstrate truncated logic that can result in ‘jumping-to-conclusions’ [43].
The study additionally incorporated self-reflectiveness (i.e., willingness to acknowledge the
possibility of being incorrect). Researchers have not previously examined this in relation to
belief in conspiracies [43], however believers in conspiracy theories typically resist alternative
arguments, particularly of a rational nature [45]. Self-certainty and self-reflectiveness represent
facets of cognitive insight, which can be conceptualised as the mental processes involved in self
re-evaluation of anomalous experiences and misunderstandings [46–47]). Barron et al. [43]
assumed that self-certainty would be the most prominent facet in relation to belief in conspir-
acy theories.
Inclusion of these conspiracy-related cognitive-perceptual measures enabled the authors to
determine whether expected associations were consistent across GCBS subscales, or a function
of particular dimensions. This was important to determine because overall GCBS scores may
indicate outcomes that are actually only attributable to specific dimensions. Moreover, this
analysis established whether, as suggested by Stojanov and Halberstadt [48], the presence of
explicit content/actors undermines the generic nature of the GCBS. For instance, Government
Malfeasance (GM) links conspiracies to governments, and Malevolent Global Conspiracies
(MG) to a small group of powerful people. Finally, testing for convergent validity provided an
assessment of construct validity, which is a significant criterion when testing the appropriate-
ness of a measure [49].
Analysis also tested structural stability of the GCBS via invariance testing. Preceding
research has failed to consider invariance (see [26,29,35]). Establishing invariance infers that
mean differences are more likely to signify accurate mean differences rather than measure-
ment bias [50], and is crucial in the context of measurement validation [51].
Materials and methods
Participants
Study one. Merging data sets from a previously published study [50] and progressing
work produced a large sample (N = 794; Mage = 23.26 years, SD = 7.90, range 18–78). There
were 248 males (31%), Mage = 25.31 years, SD = 9.56, range = 18–71; and 546 females (69%),
Mage = 22.35 years, SD = 6.82, 18–78. For all study variables, skewness and kurtosis values
were within the recommended range of -2.0 to +2.0 [52]. Participant recruitment was via
emails to university staff/students and local stakeholders (businesses, leisure and vocational/
sports classes). If potential participants were younger than 18 years of age, or declared that
they had previously taken part in similar conspiracy-based research participation discontin-
ued. These were the only exclusion criteria. Researchers have successfully employed data
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amalgamation to generate large composite samples in order to evaluate scale structure and
integrity [53–56].
Study two. A market research company (Critical Mix) was employed to recruit a large
UK-based sample of adults (N = 418). The Mage was 52.44 years, SD = 14.60, range = 18–83.
The sample included 219 males (53%), Mage = 55.90 years, SD = 14.07, range = 22–83; and
199 females (47%), Mage = 48.62 years, SD = 14.24, range = 18–78. Skewness and kurtosis val-
ues fell between an acceptable range of -2.0 and +2.0 for all study variables.
Measures
Study one. Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS). This study used only the 15-item
GCBS. Within the measure, items appear as statements (e.g., “Secret organizations communi-
cate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public”). Participants respond via a
5-point Likert scale (1 = definitely not true; 2 = probably not true; 3 = not sure/cannot decide;
4 = probably true; 5 = definitely true). Within the original validation paper, the GCBS demon-
strated good psychometric properties) (see [29]). Specifically, validity (content, criterion-
related, convergent and discriminant) and reliability (internal and re-test).
Study two. Alongside the GCBS, study two employed the reality testing subscale of
Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT; [57]) and the Beck Cognitive Insight
Scale (BCIS; [46]).
IPO-RT. The IPO-RT assessed proneness to reality testing deficits [58–60]. Specifically,
the capacity to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from external stimuli, and to
maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria of reality [57]. The IPO-RT adopts an infor-
mation-processing approach to belief generation rather than a psychotic symptomology
approach (see [61]). Noting this, authors have used the IPO-RT as an index of subjective-
intuitive thinking [62].
The IPO-RT contains 20-items presented as statements (e.g., “I have seen things which do
not exist in reality”). Respondents indicate their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale,
responses range from 1 = never true to 5 = always true. Total scores on the IPO-RT range from
20 to 100 with higher scores being indicative of proneness to report experiences of reality test-
ing deficits. The IPO-RT possesses established psychometric properties. Specifically, it has
demonstrated construct validity, good internal consistency and test–retest reliability indicating
it is a largely psychometrically sound measure [61].
BCIS. The BCIS is a measure of cognitive insight, which assesses self-evaluation of judg-
ments. The scale contains a 15-item self-report measure comprising two subscales: Self-Reflec-
tiveness (9-items) (e.g., “I have jumped to conclusions too fast.”) and Self-Certainty (6-items)
(e.g., “If something feels right, it means that it is right.”). These subscales derive from the
observation that individuals with psychotic disorders (vs. psychiatric patients who did not
have psychosis) are less self-reflective (e.g., reluctant to accept the possibility that they are
wrong) and more assertive about their own conclusions. Researchers have used the BCIS with
general samples to assess differences in critical thinking [2,63].
Items appear as statements and participants rate the extent to which they agree on a 4-point
scale from 0 (do not agree at all) to 3 (agree completely). Summation of items produces sub-
scale scores. In order to compute a composite index, it is necessary to subtract the self-certainty
total from the self-reflectiveness score. The original study that validated the BCIS reported a
coefficient α for the Self-Reflectiveness scale of 0.68 and for Self-Certainty 0.60 [64]. Subse-
quent studies reported alphas ranging from 0.72 to 0.74 for Self-Reflectiveness and from 0.72
to 0.75 for Self-Certainty [65–66]. These suggest a reasonable degree of internal consistency.
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Procedure
Respondents across studies followed the same general protocol (all projects centred on scien-
tifically unsubstantiated beliefs, cognitive-perceptual factors and decision-making). The only
procedural difference between the two studies in this paper was that participants in Study one
completed measures either online or in paper form, whereas Study two was entirely online.
Qualtrics hosted the internet version, which potential respondents accessed via a web link.
Prior to participation, respondents received detailed background information. This stated
the nature of the study and outlined ethics. Only respondents providing informed consent pro-
gressed to provide brief demographic details (age, preferred gender and general location) and
complete the scales. Prior to responding, instructions asked participants to carefully read the
questions, answer all items, take their time, and respond in an open and honest manner. To
prevent order effects, scale position randomly rotated across respondents.
Ethics
For Study one, as preparation for grant bids (October 2016, 2017, and 2018) the researchers
gained ethical authorisation for a series of studies examining belief in conspiracy theories and
cognitive-perceptual personality factors. Following formal submission, the Director of the
Research Institute for Health and Social Change and the Manchester Metropolitan University
Faculty of Health, Psychology and Social Care Ethics Committee gave ethical approval.
For Study two, the research team obtained ethical authorization for the project ‘Relation-
ships between personality and conspiracist ideation’. The study investigated the links between
certain personality characteristics and belief in conspiracy theories. The Faculty of Health and
Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Northumbria University provided ethical
approval.
In order to participate in the studies respondents provided informed consent by ticking/
clicking a box prior to the self-report measures indicating that they understood the nature of
the study and intended to participate. Participants did this with the awareness that they could
cease participation at any point during completion of the measures. Additionally, the briefing
instructions informed participants of their right to withdraw submitted responses up to four
weeks after completion. Withdrawal at this stage required emailing the research team with a
unique personal identifier.
Analysis
Study one, using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), assessed the adequacy of proposed GCBS
solutions. A unidimensional model operated as a baseline contrast for subsequent models.
Models tested included those proposed by Brotherton et al. [29], Swami et al. [26] and Atari
et al. [35]. These propose different numbers of correlated factors.
The Brotherton et al. [29] original model comprises five-factors: Government Malfeasance
(GM), Extraterrestrial Cover-up (EC), Malevolent Global (MG), Personal Wellbeing (PW),
and Control of Information (CI). Whereas, the two-factor condensed Swami et al. [26] model
contains General Conspiracist Ideation (GC) and Conspiracist Beliefs about Extraterrestrial
Life (EL). Lastly, Atari et al. [35] identified three subfactors (Political Conspiracies, PC; Scien-
tific Conspiracies, SC; and Extraterrestrial Cover-up; ExC).
A number of indices determined goodness of fit. Specifically, the chi-square (χ2) statistic,
relative fit (Comparative Fit Index, CFI; Tucker-Lewis Index, TLI), and absolute fit indices
(Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation, RMSEA; Standardised Root-Mean-Square
Residual, SRMR). For relative indices, values> 0.90 indicate good fit [67]. For absolute indi-
ces, values of .05, .06-.08, and .08–1.0 suggest good, satisfactory, and marginal fit [68].
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Consultation of RMSEA incorporated the 90% confidence interval (CI). All CFA analyses
(using Mplus 7.4 [69]) employed the robust maximum likelihood (MLR) method, which yields
maximum likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors that are robust to occurrences
of data non-normality [70]. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) compared solutions with
an equal number of variables (thus, the unidimensional, five-factor and three-factor models).
Lower values designate greater data-fit.
Invariance testing for Study one comprised multi-group CFA. This examined factor struc-
ture (configural), factor loadings (metric) and item intercepts (scalar) among men and women
for the superior factor model. For each invariance test, a CFI difference of� 0.01 and RMSEA
difference of� 0.015 [71] determined suitable fit. Lastly, reliability testing of the GCBS
involved computing Cronbach’s alpha and omega total coefficients (using SPSS and Mplus 7.4
respectively).
Identical stages of model testing occurred for Study one and Study two to determine the
replicability of the results from Study one in an independent sample. In addition, invariance
testing examined the structural equivalence of the GCBS among the Study one and Study two
samples. This comprised the same range of tests and model fit criteria as the gender invariance
analyses. For completeness, reliability testing occurred also for IPO-RT, Total BCIS, Self-Cer-
tainty and Self-Reflectiveness. Finally, a test of convergent validity in Study two involved
assessing total GCBS and subfactor correlations with suitable criterion measures. Particularly,
Reality Testing (via the Reality Testing subscale of The Inventory of Personality Organization;
IPO-RT), total Cognitive Insight (using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale; BCIS), Self-Certainty
and Self-Reflectiveness (via BCIS subscales).
Results
Study one
The undimensional model demonstrated poor fit on all indices but SRMR, χ2 (90, N = 794) =
803.431, p< .001, CFI = 0.857, TLI = 0.833, RMSEA = 0.100 (90% CI of 0.094 to 0.106),
SRMR = 0.057. The correlated five-factor model (22) reported good fit on all indices, χ2 (80,
N = 794) = 287.130, p< .001, CFI = 0.958, TLI = 0.946, RMSEA = 0.057 (90% CI of 0.050 to
0.064), SRMR = 0.033. The two-factor solution (18) had negative variance and unsatisfactory
fit (apart from SRMR), χ2 (34, N = 794) = 490.424, p< .001, CFI = 0.848, TLI = 0.799,
RMSEA = 0.130 (90% CI of 0.120 to 0.140), SRMR = 0.060. The three-factor model (28) pro-
duced good fit overall, χ2 (87, N = 794) = 498.171, p< .001, CFI = 0.918, TLI = 0.901,
RMSEA = 0.077 (90% CI of 0.071 to 0.084), SRMR = 0.045.
Comparison of AIC revealed a lower estimate for the five-factor model (31199.451) vs. the
three-factor (31458.723) and unidimensional solutions (31862.623). Evaluation of fit indices
and AIC indicated that the five-factor model (Fig 1) fit the data the best. Inspection of stan-
dardized parameter estimates revealed that all items (apart from item 15; loading of 0.587)
loaded above the strict condition of 0.6 [71]. In addition, all five factors demonstrated large
intercorrelations (Table 1).
Invariance testing comparing men and women suggested good model fit across indices at
the configural level, χ2 (160, N = 794) = 398.258, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.953, TLI = 0.938,
RMSEA = 0.061 (90% CI of 0.054 to 0.069), SRMR = 0.038. Assessment of metric invariance
reported a satisfactory CFI difference of 0.002 and no difference in RMSEA. For scalar invari-
ance, an acceptable CFI difference of 0.003 existed with no difference in RMSEA. Results sup-
port invariance of form, factor structure and intercepts.
High internal reliability existed for total GCBS (α = 0.930). Likewise, subfactors of GM (α =
0.818), EC (α = 0.851), MG (α = 0.851), PW (α = 0.774), and CI (α = 0.699) demonstrated
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acceptable to good internal consistency. Omega total evinced equivalent results to alpha: high
reliability for total GCBS (ω = 0.931), and acceptable to good reliability for all subfactors (GM
ω = 0.819; EC ω = 0.852; MG ω = 0.852; PW ω = 0.771; CI ω = 0.700).
Study two
The unidimensional model revealed good fit on CFI and SRMR. TLI was unsatisfactory and
RMSEA was marginal, χ2 (90, N = 418) = 382.533, p< .001, CFI = 0.902, TLI = 0.885,
RMSEA = 0.088 (90% CI of 0.079 to 0.097), SRMR = 0.050. A correlated five-factor solution
suggested good fit overall, χ2 (80, N = 418) = 170.416, p< .001, CFI = 0.970, TLI = 0.960,
RMSEA = 0.052 (90% CI of 0.041 to 0.063), SRMR = 0.031. Consistent with Study one, a test of
the two-factor model revealed the presence of error variance. Good fit existed for CFI and
SRMR, and unsatisfactory fit was apparent for TLI and RMSEA, χ2 (34, N = 418) = 195.447, p
< .001, CFI = 0.905, TLI = 0.875, RMSEA = 0.106 (90% CI of 0.092 to 0.121), SRMR = 0.051.
Good fit existed for the three-factor solution, χ2 (87, N = 418) = 229.592, p< .001, CFI = 0.952,
TLI = 0.942, RMSEA = 0.062 (90% CI of 0.053 to 0.072), SRMR = 0.037.
Fig 1. Five-factor GCBS model for Study one. Ellipses represent latent variables; rectangles represent measured
variables; ‘e’ represents error. �� p< .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230365.g001
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The AIC statistic indicated a lower estimate for the five-factor model (16587.554) in com-
parison with the three-factor (16655.384) and unidimensional model (16864.292). Consistent
with Study one, the five-factor model (Fig 2) reports superior data-model fit. Standardized
parameter estimates inferred that all items exceeded 0.6. All subfactors evidenced large inter-
correlations (Table 1).
Gender invariance in relation to form (configural) suggested good fit, χ2 (160, N = 418) =
258.462, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.968, TLI = 0.957, RMSEA = 0.054 (90% CI of 0.042 to 0.066),
SRMR = 0.037. A difference of 0.001 existed for both CFI and RMSEA when examining metric
invariance. At the scalar level, a satisfactory CFI difference of 0.002 was apparent, with no dif-
ference in RMSEA. Thus, the GCBS was invariant across gender.
Multi-group analysis comparing Studies one and two reported good model fit at the config-
ural stage, χ2 (160, N = 1212) = 450.931, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.964, TLI = 0.952, RMSEA = 0.055
(90% CI of 0.049 to 0.061), SRMR = 0.031. At the metric level, satisfactory CFI and RMSEA
differences of 0.001 existed. Scalar invariance testing reported acceptable CFI (0.007) alongside
a suitable RMSEA difference of 0.003. Findings support invariance among the Study one and
Study two samples.
Similar to Study one, total GCBS demonstrated high internal consistency (α = 0.945).
Equally, good internal consistency existed for subfactors of GM (α = 0.854), EC (α = 0.861),
MG (α = 0.849), PW (α = 0.821), and CI (α = 0.787). Omega total for total GCBS was high (ω
= 0.934), and was good for all subfactors (GM ω = 0.854; EC ω = 0.861; MG ω = 0.849; PW ω =
0.821; CI ω = 0.787). Alpha and omega total were high for IPO-RT (α = 0.952 and ω = 0.953),
good for Total BCIS (α = 0.830 and ω = 0.822), marginally acceptable for Self-Certainty (α =
0.680 and ω = 0.690), and good for Self-Reflectiveness (α = 0.823 and ω = 0.824).
Table 1. Study one and Study two intercorrelations.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Study one
1. Total GCBS 47.649 12.445 0.878�� 0.839�� 0.814�� 0.869�� 0.788��
2. GM 10.233 2.934 0.692�� 0.599�� 0.694�� 0.713��
3. MG 9.405 3.120 0.578�� 0.668�� 0.556��
4. ET 8.352 3.313 0.660�� 0.514��
5. PW 8.575 3.032 0.604��
6. CI 11.083 2.438
Study two
1. Total GCBS 39.368 13.853 0.889�� 0.891�� 0.810�� 0.911�� 0.828�� 0.516�� 0.292�� 0.253�� 0.243��
2. GM 7.408 3.207 0.767 �� 0.631 �� 0.775�� 0.677�� 0.471�� 0.262�� 0.229�� 0.214��
3. MG 8.000 3.306 0.638�� 0.771�� 0.674�� 0.453�� 0.237�� 0.217�� 0.180��
4. ET 6.893 3.321 0.677 �� 0.541�� 0.496�� 0.272�� 0.207�� 0.265��
5. PW 7.631 3.198 0.723�� 0.513�� 0.261�� 0.240�� 0.197��
6. CI 9.434 2.959 0.290�� 0.233�� 0.202�� 0.193��
7. IPO-RT 41.760 15.909 0.483�� 0.518�� 0.264��
8. Total BCIS 33.078 6.928 0.893�� 0.792��
9. Self-Certainty 19.254 4.692 0.432��
10. Self-Reflectiveness 13.824 3.457
GCBS, Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale; GM, Government Malfeasance; MG, Malevolent Global Conspiracies; ET, Extraterrestrial Cover-up; PW, Personal Wellbeing;
CI, Control of Information; IPO-RT, Reality Testing; BCIS, Beck Cognitive Insight Scale.
�� indicates p< .001
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230365.t001
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Assessment of convergent validity revealed moderate to large positive correlations between
total GCBS and GCBS subscales with Reality Testing (IPO-RT). Small positive correlations
existed between total GCBS and GCBS subscales with total BCIS, Self-Certainty and Self-
Reflectiveness (Table 1).
Discussion
The present study examined the psychometric properties of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs
Scale (GCBS) [29], which is a recognised, widely used measure of belief in conspiracy theories
(e.g., [32]). In this context, researchers typically assume the GCBS provides a global, unidimen-
sional solution. This interpretation ignores alternative factorial solutions, and important
Fig 2. Five-factor GCBS model for Study two. Latent variables are represented by ellipses; measured variables are represented by
rectangles; error is represented by ‘e’. �� p< .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230365.g002
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conceptual concerns about GCBS content (see [26,29,35,39]. Indeed, justification for GCBS
scoring extends rarely beyond a cursory citing of the original development and validation
report (e.g., [23,37,72]). Acknowledging these issues, this paper evaluated the structure and
measurement properties of the GCBS. This not only helps to legitimise previous findings, but
also ensures that subsequent work scores the instrument appositely.
The original five-factor solution [29], comprising Government Malfeasance, Extraterrestrial
Cover-up, Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Personal Wellbeing, and Control of Information,
produced good data-model fit in two independent samples (i.e., university-based and market
research company; participation panel). Further analysis revealed that high internal reliability
(alpha and omega total) existed for full-scale and subfactor scores. Moreover, the five-factor
solution demonstrated superior fit to competing models (unidimensional; two-factor [26]; and
three-factor [35]).
In line with Brotherton et al. [29], large intercorrelations existed between factors. This find-
ing was consistent with the view that GCBS dimensions reflect associated assumptions. The
presence of related factors provides some justification for using the full-scale score as a global
index of belief in conspiracy theories. From a practical perceptive, this also provides a rationale
for employing the GCBS as a brief, expedient measure.
Study two, where correlations between GCBS subfactors were generally consistent across
convergent measures, provided further vindication for the use of the full-scale score. In the
case of BCIS, all correlations across Self-Certainty and Self-Reflectiveness dimensions were in
the small (r = .10) to medium (r = .30) range [73]. Concerning IPO-RT, the correlation with
Control of Information (r = .29) was weaker than associations with Government Malfeasance,
Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, and Personal Wellbeing (these ran-
ged from r = .45 to .52).
This outcome is difficult to interpret. Looking at Control of information, the subfactor
indexes unethical control and suppression of information by organizations, including the gov-
ernment, the media, scientists and corporations. At face value, this outcome tentatively sug-
gests that notions of scientific concealment and technological manipulation are less intuitively
appealing. Clearly, further work in this domain is required.
GCBS full-scale scores correlated weakly with BCIS dimensions Self-Certainty and Self-
Reflectiveness, and moderately with the IPO-RT. Self-certainty findings concurred with those
of Barron et al. [43], who found a moderate positive correlation between the factor and
endorsement of conspiracist beliefs (Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory, BCTI, [22]).
Existence of a weaker correlation between self-reflectiveness and GCBS scores compared to
self-certainty and GCBS scores supports the view that self-reflectiveness would be less promi-
nent among believers in conspiracy theories [43]. Additionally, the positive correlation
between IPO-RT aligned with that reported by Drinkwater et al. [8]. Collectively, these results
concur with the view that belief in conspiracy theories is concomitant with overconfidence in
the validity of personal beliefs [43] and higher levels of subjective-intuitive thinking [see 50].
Support for the five-factor GCBS solution did not accord with recent work by Swami et al.
[26, 39] and Atari et al. [35]. Looking at the composition of their samples (i.e., crowd sourcing
and general population from public places) and comparing them to the present paper (i.e., uni-
versity-based and market research provider), there were no obvious or systematic differences
that could explain the observed variations in factorial structure. Furthermore, articles produc-
ing and replicating the five-factor solution have employed a range of recruitment techniques
(i.e., blog post, online forums, and emailing list) [22]. These sampling approaches are repre-
sentative of self-report studies investigating belief in conspiracy theories generally (see [38]).
Within the current paper, the GCBS demonstrated invariance of form, factor structure and
intercepts across gender in both independent samples. Moreover, satisfactory invariance
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existed when comparing across the UK-based samples (i.e., studies one and two). Overall, con-
sideration of present and previous work suggests that the GCBS five-factor structure is not an
artefact arising from a particular sample type. Although, further research into potential mea-
surement bias is required since the original validation and present validation studies were UK-
focused, whereas Swami et al. [26] and Atari et al. [35] used samples drawn from the USA and
Iran respectively.
Noting this, subsequent work should examine scale invariance across wider ranging con-
texts in order to delimit situations where the five-factor and one-factor solutions are most
appropriate. This includes extensive cross-cultural comparisons because variations in societal
norms are likely to influence belief in conspiracy theories. A recent example of this is the Japa-
nese Version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS-J) [36], which supported a two-
factor structure comprising General Conspiracist Beliefs and Extraterrestrial Conspiracist
Beliefs. Tellingly, the authors suggested this two-factor structure emerged due to differences in
the nature of conspiracy beliefs among Japanese vs. Western societies. Widespread cross-cul-
tural comparison would extend the process initiated by the present paper with British samples
to other countries. An additional academic benefit is that this comparison will reveal cultural
differences in prevalence and content of conspiracy theories.
The observation that the factorial structure of the GCBS may be prone to contextual varia-
tion is consistent with Bruder et al. [31], who contend that the use of specific content-related
detail gives rise to cultural response variations. This issue pertains to the GCBS because it con-
tains items that refer to explicit topics, such as technology (i.e., “New and advanced technology
which would harm current industry is being suppressed”) and terrorism (i.e., “The govern-
ment permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement”).
This specificity introduces the potential for contextual bias.
For instance, views of technological advance vary across societies. Democratic countries gen-
erally regard technological advance as progressive and financially necessary, whereas autocratic
states often frustrate technical development for political/economic reasons. Similarly, social, reli-
gious and geographical factors can influence perceptions of terrorism. Illustratively, it is common
knowledge that the U.S. government planned a false flag operation (Operation Northwoods) in
1962 [74]. This recommended staging an attack on American soil in order to provide a justifica-
tion for attacking Cuba. In this instance, individuals with awareness of Operation Northwoods,
who endorse the notion of orchestrated terrorist attacks, are indicating political and historical
awareness rather than belief in conspiracy theories. This point concurs with Stojanov and Hal-
berstadt [48], who contend that the presence of factors that refer to explicit conspirators (i.e.,
government and powerful people) may undermine the generic nature of the GCBS.
The inclusion of thematic specificity within the GCBS also introduces possible temporal
instability. This arises from the fact that belief in particular theories changes over time. Some
theories increase in popularity, whereas others decline. In the case of terrorism for instance,
awareness of false flag operations fluctuates because of media attention. Tentatively, this may
explain the structural variations observed by Swami et al. [26,39]. Future studies could examine
this by comparing item endorsement across multiple time points. Such repeated test-retest
would establish the extent to which factors and items possess temporal stability. These criti-
cisms suggest that the measurement of belief in conspiracy theories benefits from adopting a
focus on overarching thematic ideology and concepts. From this perspective, the multidimen-
sional GCBS is better suited for exploring domain-specific differences in conspiracy beliefs. The
extent to which these are generalizable depends on ensuing work establishing scale invariance.
The issue of factorial stability is not unique to the GCBS. Other psychometric instruments
experience similar difficulties. For example, questions concerning stability exist for the Mental
Toughness Questionnaire 48 (MTQ48, [75]), which is a measure of the capability to cope with
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difficulties and to achieve self-defined aims [76–77]. The scale authors report that four high-
order dimensions (i.e., 4Cs: Challenge, Commitment, Control and Confidence) exist. Perry,
Clough, Crust, Earle, and Nicholls [78] provided support for this solution. However, other
researchers have reported large degrees of misspecification with samples comprised of elite,
amateur and non-athletes [79]. Other studies have also failed to reproduce the 4C solution,
and questioned its appropriateness [77,80]. Explicitly, Gucciardi et al. [80] was unable to dem-
onstrate good data fit in athlete and workplace samples.
Finally, subsequent studies could attempt to explain observed variations in GCBS factor
structure by testing the various models in a large, heterogeneous sample. Investigators could
achieve this by aggregating publicly available data. Increasing sample size will reduce the
potential influence of random factors, and should result in the production of a purified facto-
rial structure. Ultimately, this may result in the modification of existing items and recommend
the generation of new questions. This process, consistent with points raised in this paper will
facilitate the further development of generic, culture free content.
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